Introduction
scientific conclusion, we have analysed only the views of authors considered to be the key representatives of the three main theories. Hence, only in a narrow context of time, theory and author, can we reach more accurate conclusions. For the purposes of this paper, Fukuyama is the "Liberalist", Huntington is "Realist" and Brzezinski is a "Rationalist".
Analytical framework
In this paper, this framework is presented in a two-fold manner, as a conceptual framework and a contextual framework. In the conceptual framework, one must underline the ontological and epistemological intentions of each of the three main theories.
• Liberalism is one of the oldest IR theories. Optimism for peace and human progress are key words of its vocabulary. These promote free trade, individual freedom, a world order of rule of law, open diplomacy and collective security. The theory recognizes more IR entities except states, meaning individuals and organizations. Democracy, according to theoreticians, is the ideal form of governance for all countries of the world. The main representatives of the theory are cosmopolitans.
• Realism is also a rather old and pessimistic theory tradition. The longstanding domination of Realism over IR emphasises the endless race for power and security of state, as the only relevant actor in IR. Sovereignty, anarchy and security dilemmas are fundamental terms in its lectures. The main idea of global progress is mainly missing in its vocabulary. Moral and social principles are relevant only inside the state, where the security is provided by the state itself. Cosmopolitan projects are thought to be less relevant for the IR, the potential of war is always present in states, and according to Realists, states permanently are engaged in war, but only in different forms.
• In a difference from the two theories above, Rationalism is a newer theory, and was born only after the Cold War, as an outcome of debate between the two above-mentioned theories. Rationalism is drawn towards elements of both Realism and Liberalism. Although this theory has seized middle ground between the two, Rationalist theoreticians cannot agree fully to any of the theories. Rationalism was "via media" between Liberalism and Realism. "Via media" was used by Martin Wight for those perspectives which were hostile to the current order, and were committed to its transformation. Contextual framework. This paper is realized in a methodological, comparative and a very critical context. The methodology used was carefully selected, and is very typical for our topic. The main method used is the method of comparative analysis, which in details is also suitable to this paper, which is also comparative. This is the best method possible, a method which is the only which assigns the title "scientific" to this paper, otherwise it would only be pseudo-scientific. 
Findings and analysis (hot points)
Setting from the practice of global developments, we have learned that by the end of each major event, such as widespread wars, many efforts are made in setting "World Orders". Hence, after the World War I, a new "World Order" was built with the League of Nations, and then after the WWII, a new "World Order" was set with the United Nations.
By the end of Cold War, the US President George Bush proclaimed a "New World Order", which was to entail four principles: peaceful solution of disputes, solidarity against aggression, smaller and controlled weapons reserves, and equal treatment for all people. 7 As one may ascertain, these four principles contain liberal elements, and as such, this concept is rendered liberalism-supported. These principles renewed the hope of pacification of IR developments in a post-Cold War world.
Nevertheless, Brzezinski, biased towards Realism, argues that the "New World Order" concept, in a way or another, "reminded of illusions fed for some time after 1945 that the WWII coalition would serve as the pillar to a new more peaceful and collaborative "World Order" under the UN. The "New World Order" was also created on the foundations of a false hope: that the American victory in the Cold War would be associated with encroaching into a new global system, based on legality and widespread democracy… with the fall of Communism and the associated illusion, and with the end of ideological disputes, for the US, Globalization became a suitable term and an attractive interpretation of the global situation which was developing. 8 
(See table 1).
One might immediately ask the question "why" was the American President that proclaimed this "Order". One answer is quite related to what Kissinger had claimed, that in a post-Cold War world, the US remain the only superpower with the capacity of intervening in any part of the globe. 9 ....This prevailing position of the USA has transformed it into a necessary factor of world stability. 10 In this sense, with a Realist tone, Brzezinski claims that the position of the US in the world is historically unparalleled. 11 Our argument in this sense is that this dominating position of the US comes as a logical outcome of the absence of a potential alternative rival, like the USSR. In the same view, one must recognize that the US did not win -at least in the conventional sense -the Cold War, but it was the USSR that lost it. It can still be called an American victory, since both superpowers were competing for it. And when one loses the race, the victory of the other becomes a "natural _____________________________ Iliria International Review -2011/1 © Felix-Verlag, Holzkirchen, Germany and Iliria College, Pristina, Kosovo doctrine" of the winner, and therefore, liberal principles proclaimed by the USA became "a natural doctrine of the World's hegemonic".
Assessment of democracy and teleology of Liberalism
In elaborating political developments after the Cold War, Fukuyama's arguments are entirely enclosed in a Liberalist cloth. In a confident assessment of Liberalism's teleology, Fukuyama claims that "the Soviet Union collapse only proved that Liberal democracy did actually have no serious ideological competition: it was the ultimate point of ideological evolution of humanity, and the ultimate form of human governance". 12 Thus, he came to a rather sad conclusion, that everything should be rather boring hereafter.
In relation to this argument, Brzezinski this time is attracted to Liberal approaches, whereby he argues that "the victory in the Cold War left America on no side of the globe. Not only did it dominate, but there was no possible accusation, globally attractive and intellectually comprehensive against the American system. "The inevitable historical human march towarsd Communism" was dramatically overturned with the disintegration of the Soviet block. 13 In a way, the liberally-biased arguments provide an understanding that the known argument against capitalism was dissolved: capitalism was proven to be more productive than socialism. Even the Communist China was now trying to protect its "Communist" rule by practising economic capitalism.
Nevertheless, Realists like Huntington see the world differently. According to him, the moment of euphoria at the end of Cold War gave birth to an illusion of harmony, which was later proven to be precisely an illusion. In the early 1990-es, he argues, the world became more alterable, but not necessarily more peaceful. This illusion of harmony was soon disrupted by multiple ethnic conflicts and "ethnic cleansing". 14 (See table 2 ).
These statements of Fukuyama can be argued to be rather pompous and emotional bursts, thereby drawing him away from scientific objectivity. Although several principles proclaimed by him seemed to be able to set ground, they were rather overblown. As one may see now, these tendencies of democracy and globalization did not go as far as he believed, which may prove that he created a spiked utopia, by trying to explain the whole reality of IR developments in a single-handed manner. Both Fukuyama and Huntington are conspiratorial and megalomaniac. Huntington also used several IR developments to interpret them in a subjective manner, and in a narrow theoretical angle. By presenting the anarchic condition as being so chaotic, he broke himself the principles of Realism, because the foundations of Realists _____________________________ Iliria International Review -2011/1 © Felix-Verlag, Holzkirchen, Germany and Iliria College, Pristina, Kosovo onto power and war are ultimately there to preserve peace, if there is peace to preserve. Meanwhile, Brzezinski seems to be a bit more objective in his assessment, he keeps a flower on one hand, and the sword in the other, but his utopia adds up when drawing towards a liberal approach, thereby deviating from the middle ground of Rationalism.
I am not trying to make myself best -since anyway, each theoretician presents a piece of reality, and when all pieces are taken together, the reality is better recognized -but this is done to provide our own alternative. We think that there is less order than argued by Liberalists, and more peace and collaboration than propagated by Realists.
Another critique for the three authors is the one related to their teleological evaluations. This is rather dangerous, because these make them have a monochromatic view on the reality of these developments, over the tendencies of democracy and globalisation.
The Western type of governance and political economy Even here, there are teleological and rushed assessments of IR developments after the Cold War. Thus, Liberalism and its top philosopher, in a list without any other competitors -Fukuyama, had believed that Western forms of governance and political economy are the ultimate destination which would be eventually reached by the entire human race. This raises a number of issues of dogmatism in the IR.
Firstly: His claim that political and economic development always ultimately reaches the liberal capitalist democracy, he assumes that the non-Western world makes efforts in pursuing Western paths of modernization: stated otherwise, the Western modernization path does not need to cope with any universal challenge, similar to what Communism was, and eventually, it will command a global harmony 15 . This path is pursued also by Brzezinski, while his Rationalism takes liberal colour. He stated that "social effects of America after the Cold War also contain the occurrence of a phenomenon similar to a cultural revolution, but an attractive and non-violent phenomenon, which continues to expand, and is more sustainable and more transforming 16 . Nevertheless, the global political process -assuming that forces of chaos will not be able to rule over the global policy arena -is increasingly creating deeper collaboration in a world scale. 17 Huntington's realism strongly counters the Western modernism, which would eventually command a global harmony, as presented by Liberals. He argues that Islam is the only civilization which has put existence of the West to question. 18 These teleological assumptions of these authors may be rather risky, making conspiratorial thesis of Huntington at times realized, especially with the case of terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 . The way these were interpreted by President Bush, as attacks against America, was completely wrong. With his statements, such as the "axis of evil", Bush seemed to call upon the American people to protect not lest than their own civilization against apocalyptic threats posed by global terrorism. This new mission unavoidably added pressure on the American democracy, which was already substantial in terms of the global hegemonic role of the US (mentioned above), and it meant that in the meantime, "the fight against terrorism" would become an exclusively American initiative, and mainly anti-Islamic initiative. In this way, if things are seen like this, the forecast by Huntington on the "clash of civilizations" might seem an inevitable prophecy.
Secondly: Fukuyama's argument assumes that the West is the predecessor of moral and political truth, the progress of which would oblige all societies to attain them, without consideration of national and cultural differences 19 . This emphasizes the cosmopolitan character of Fukuyama. Nevertheless, although more sceptical, realists are closer to the target of objectivity. Realism of Huntington claims that in a world after Cold War, the most important differences between nations are not ideological, political or economic. Differences are cultural. In the post-Cold war world, culture is both a dividing and unifying force. People divided by ideology, but unified in culture, connect together, like two Germanies did, or like the two Koreas have begun, and several Chinas 20 .
In one way, Huntington is rather right in this assessment. He is pretty accurate when assessing and arguing about culture, especially in the past, in the time when he wrote about it. He was right in his argument that culture joins people and societies in several cases and contexts. Because in the contrary, societies which were unified in ideology or historical circumstances, but divided in civilization, they either shatter, like in the case of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Bosnia, or suffer from strong tensions, such is the case with Ukrain, Nigeria, Sri Lanka and many other countries.
From the doctrine of social sciences, it is widely known that they are rather flawed in forecast of political phenomena. In most cases, scientists fail in forecast, which also happened to our "scientists" analysed here. E.g. Huntington tries to explicate major issues of global policy by analytical categories such as culture. Hence, he tries to discover new planets by looking into the telescope, and surely he will miss micro-organisms when looking through the telescope! Thirdly: the Fukuyama's view that the expansion of capitalism confronts with little or no resistance, raises vital questions on governance and political community, such as: What are the implications of globalism for nation-states and their sovereign powers? 21 . Despite the liberal proclamation of increased globalist tendencies and the victory of liberalism, records say otherwise. (See  table 3 ).
These views of globalization look pale! This is the argument of realists. For Huntington, the years after the Cold War witnessed initiation of abrupt changes in identity of peoples and symbols of such identities. Global policies started reforming along cultural lines. Bowing banners were a sign of transition, but they are being raised and flagged higher every day 22 . This time, Brzezinski lines himself on Realism, where he argues the absence of strong implications of globalization, where the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is now a reality. In today's circumstances, when the global power of the USA lacks authority, while the world authority of United Nations lacks necessary power 23 . If we would compare, for example, the spending of states on two types of means of influence on conflict resolution, meaning for the military forces and the UN, we would see that the world spends $800 Billion for the military, and around $2 Billion for the UN. This ratio is more or less similar in the US: every American citizen pays (on average) around one thousand dollars for the American Military, and around 2 dollars a year for UN membership fees (while the US have more than 1 Billion dollars in unpaid fees). 24 Sceptics of globalization doubt whether the globalization itself is a global phenomenon. They recommend the term "triadism", to label the three large ingredients thereof, the US, Europe and Japan, and the term "Glocalism" for its local context. In some aspect, it may seem that state sovereignty has only been empowered as a result of environment created by globalization, for the possibilities of promotion of some autonomous values of states, and guarantees of their sovereignty. Consequently, implication of globalization on sovereign states create several paradox side effects. E.g. globalization integrates while dividing, it creates equality while causing inequality, it creates rich people while impoverishing, provides opportunities while taking them, etc. Fourthly: Fukuyama believes that progress in human history may be measured by elimination and adoption of legitimacy principles, which have evolved in time in internal political orders 25 . This leads to the assertion by Robert Doyle that "liberal democracies are able to individually eliminate use of force in relations with each other", 26 a view which counters the realist assertion that the anarchical nature of the international system implies that states are involved in a battle for security.
Henry Kissinger had stated that the "international system of the 21 st century… will have at least six large powers: United States, Europe, China, Japan, Russia, and likely, also India" 27 . The six powers of Kissinger pertain to five very different civilizations, and apart from that, there are important Islamic states, the strategic position, large population and/or oil deposits of which increase their influence on global matters. In this new world, local policy is a policy of ethnicity; global policy is a policy of civilizations. The rivalry of superpowers has been replaced by a clash of civilizations 28 .
One must take into account that this tendency of Fukuyama's liberalism resembles with the idea of Kant of "permanent peace". Yet, even if there must be harmony between states with internal democratic orders, these democracies, as seen in practice, have had much of an appetite for war against authoritarian states. This has happened, and continues to happen, due to efforts of democratic states to impose their own form of government to other states that do not have them. We do not aim for anything else apart from showing that this has caused and continues to cause ideological conflicts, thereby overthrowing the thesis of Huntington, that conflicts will be cultural, and not ideological.
Inside and looking on the outside, or outside and looking to the inside Fukuyama -consequently Liberalism -after the Cold War, relived a longstanding view held by liberal nationalists, that the spread of legitimate internal political orders would eventually bring about the end of international conflicts 29 . This is neo-Kantian position. Immanuel Kant stated that "permanent peace" can be achieved only if the majority, or all countries, would have a Republican governance. According to Fukuyama, this seems to be happening, because he is impressed with the occurrence of common legitimacy principles between great powers, and that at an extent in which liberal democracies have gone beyond This approach is opposed by neo-realism, which argues that moral aspirations of states are impeded by the absence of a supreme authority which would regulate their behaviour to each other. The anarchical nature of the international system equates behaviour in foreign policy, associating them with the system of policy of power. The demands of a strategic rule and security are the key priorities in an unsafe world, and they soon go beyond ethical intentions of states, independent of their internal political character.
For example, Kenneth Waltz emphasizes the similarity of behaviour in foreign policy between countries of different political order of two superpowers during the Cold War. 31 This may be illustrated with the example of the Vietnam War, where the Soviet Union supported the Vietnamese guerrilla fighters against the USA, while the USA supported Taleban guerrilla fighters fighting against the Soviet in the Afghanistan war. Hence, this approach of the "inside looking on the outside" is not materializing today, even when democracy is in its peaking stage of expansion of its history. Kant and Fukuyama were convinced that "permanent peace" would be achieved when at least a majority of regimes would be democratic.
Arguments beg to differ. The scholar Fareed Zakaria, provides facts that today, around 120 of 200 states of the world are democratic, and they include the majority of the world's population (more accurately 54.8%), a large increase, even in comparison with a decade earlier. 32 Realism defends another approach, the approach of being "outside and looking on the inside". According to them, the external anarchical nature of the international system, in most cases, influences decisively on the internal nature of states and nations. In a way, this is more convincing than the approach of liberals. Though, Huntington blurs this approach when he involves cultural components into the reasoning. According to him, the behaviour of core states of civilization with other civilizations would determine other civilization members' behaviour of their cultures.
Huntington forwards an example that "a civilization is like a wider family, and similar to senior family members, core states provide their family members support, but also discipline". 33 Although convincing in a first sight, this is dangerous, because according to him, it seems like cultures and civilizations are destined to war. When he compares civilization with family and kinship, in a way, he supports the primitive patriarchal family, thereby destroying the contemporaneous monogamous family, namely the modern international society as an ensemble of these families. Practice has shown that the thing which is the least appreciated by states is imposing their behaviour. Huntington seems to defend that!?
The conflict between the approaches "outside from the inside" and "inside from the outside" towards international relations is an important line of demarcation in modern international theory, especially after the Cold War. These tensions seem to be eased to some extent by rationalism. Therefore, in a difference from two other authors zealously defending their approaches, Brzezinski finds some balance between the two, protecting one and opposing the other, and vice versa.
Arguing about the "outside from the inside" approach, he states that "America from today will be more tangible, when democracy outside the country will take a defensive position, while democracy from the outside, in exchange, will be more tangible if America is threatened 34 .
In arguing the "inside from the outside" approach, he provides facts in relation to the orientation of global hegemony. Brzezinski is convinced that the "global American hegemony (remember the natural doctrine of the global hegemonic, mentioned above) is lead by the American democracy; in no time before has a global hegemony been exercised by a truly democratic and pluralist country. Nevertheless, the necessity of hegemony may clash fundamentally with values of democracy, thereby putting national security against civil rights and decisiveness against maturity. Therefore, it is time to make the question whether the global hegemony may endanger the American democracy itself 35 .
The question must be responded in looking behind. When America broke its principles of isolationism with Woodrow Wilson, it entered the 21 st century with a challenge: that the world would be a place with no threat to democracy. Now, in the beginning of the 21 st century, the task of the leaders of hegemony is to make democracy safe for the world. 
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